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I. INTRODUCTION
1

On January 14, 2014, Governor Jerry Brown declared a state of emergency.
Suffering from severe drought since 2012, California desperately needed water
for its communities.2 Governor Brown called on “all Californians to conserve
water in every way possible” because of a decrease in agricultural production, an
increase in wildfires, and a fear of drinking water shortages.3 Even before
declaring a state of emergency, Brown signed an executive order in May 2013,
allowing the government to implement actions more quickly and asking
Californians to continue conserving water.4
California’s water supply is a diverse puzzle.5 Groundwater is an essential
6
piece to that puzzle. In response to an ever-increasing shortage of groundwater,
the legislature passed the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act of 2014
7
(SGMA). SGMA provided a solid foundation, however, it was not a perfect
8
series of bills. In 2015, the legislature attempted to remedy the uncertainties left
by SGMA with a slew of groundwater legislation.9 When these bills reached the
Senate Committee on Natural Resources and Water, the committee consolidated
10
them into Senator Fran Pavley’s bill—Chapter 255. While Chapter 255 makes
some changes to SGMA, it does not include all possible methods for improving
11
groundwater management to completely sustain California’s groundwater.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Chapter 255 attempts to aid the implementation of the Sustainable
Groundwater Management Act.12 SGMA was a three-bill package comprising AB
1739, SB 1168, and SB 1319—Governor Brown’s administration vastly

1. Press Release, Office of Governor Edmond G. Brown Jr., State of Emergency Declaring Drought (Jan.
17, 2014), available at http://gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=18368 [hereinafter Emergency Press Release] (on file
with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. OFFICE OF ASSEMBLY MEMBER SUSAN EGGMAN, AB 647 FACT SHEET (2015–16 Reg. Sess.)
[hereinafter AB 647 FACT SHEET] (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
6. Id.
7. Press Release, CA Water Found., California Water Foundation Praises Gov. Brown’s Signing of
Landmark Groundwater Legislation into Law (Sept. 16, 2014) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review).
8. See infra Part II (explaining the legal background of SGMA).
9. See infra note 154 and accompanying text (describing the various groundwater legislation introduced
to remedy SGMA).
10. See infra Part IV.B (explaining how the legislation was consolidated into Chapter 255).
11. See infra Part IV (analyzing the changes Chapter 255 makes to SGMA and their potential impact).
12. See 2015 Cal. STAT. ch. 255 (amending sections of the Water Code created by SGMA).
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supported each bill. Following reports from the Association of California Water
Agencies (ACWA), the California Water foundation (CWF), and many
stakeholder meetings, the governor signed the three-bill package into law on
14
September 16, 2014. This section will discuss Governor Brown’s support of
SGMA, the origins of the three-bill package, and the impact ACWA and CWF
had on SGMA’s existing law. 15
A. Support from Governor Jerry Brown and the Three-Bill Package
In January 2014, Governor Brown released his California Water Action Plan
detailing the importance of protecting groundwater basins at risk of overdraft.16
The governor believed the plan was essential for California to manage water
wisely.17 He also believed that if local agencies were unable to protect
groundwater basins, the importance of groundwater sustainability necessitated
18
state intervention. In his 2014 budget, Governor Brown prioritized finding
19
solutions to California’s water problems.
Soon after the Governor voiced his concerns, the legislature delved into
20
groundwater regulation. In February 2014, Assembly Member Roger Dickinson
introduced AB 1739 to give the State Water Board power to place a basin on
probationary and to create interim plans for sustainability during that status.21
Then, Senator Pavley introduced SB 1168 to allow the State Water Board to
22
designate basins as “high-, medium- or low-priority.” These two bills arose

13. STATE OF CALIFORNIA, SUSTAINABLE GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENT ACT BROCHURE (2015),
available at http://groundwater.ca.gov/docs/sgma_brochure_jan_2015.pdf [hereinafter, SGMA BROCHURE] (on
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
14. Press Release, CA Water Found., supra note 7; ASS’N OF CAL. WATER AGENCIES,
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACHIEVING GROUNDWATER SUSTAINABILITY 1 (2014) [hereinafter
RECOMMENDATIONS].
15. See infra Part II (demonstrating Governor Brown’s support and referencing the impact ACWA and
CWF had on SGMA).
16. OFFICE OF GOVERNOR EDMUND G. BROWN, JR., CALIFORNIA WATER ACTION PLAN 13 (2014)
[hereinafter CALIFORNIA WATER ACTION PLAN].
17. Press Release, Office of Governor Edmond G. Brown Jr., Governor Brown Signs Historic
Groundwater Legislation (Sept. 16, 2014), http://gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=18701 [hereinafter Signing Press
Release] (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
18. CALIFORNIA WATER ACTION PLAN, supra note 16, at 14.
19. OFFICE OF GOVERNOR EDMUND G. BROWN, JR., 2014 CALIFORNIA FIVE-YEAR INFRASTRUCTURE
PLAN 25 (2014).
20. See AB 1168, 2014 Leg., 2013–2014 Sess. (Cal. 2014) (enacted by Chapter 346); AB 1739, 2014
Leg., 2013–2014 Sess. (Cal. 2014) (enacted by Chapter 347) (illustrating the various bills introduced after
Governor Brown mentioned the importance of preserving groundwater).
21. Matt Williams, Groundwater Bills Move Forward in the Legislature, ASS’N OF CAL. WATER
AGENCIES (May 28, 2014), http://www.acwa.com/news/water-news/groundwater-bills-move-forwardlegislature (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
22. AB 1168, 2014 Leg., 2013–2014 Sess. (Cal. 2014) (enacted by Chapter 346); Williams, supra note
21.
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from ACWA’s 2011 report emphasizing the importance of local control over
groundwater basins.23 According to the report, providing local control was the
most effective means to achieve sustainable groundwater management.24
Unfortunately, local control alone was ineffective, and local agencies required
enhanced authority to accomplish their sustainability goals.25
In order to assess the policies surrounding groundwater, committees from
26
both houses held informational hearings. Those hearings revealed that, at the
time, local agencies could not create sustainable cycles of extraction because the
groundwater pumping policies were inadequate.27 Soon after, Senator Pavley
introduced SB 1319 to add additional criteria basins must meet before receiving a
probationary status, thus strengthening the bill package.28 Governor Brown
signed the three-bill package into law on September 16, 2014.29
B. ACWA and CWF Influence on SGMA’s Existing Law
The authors incorporated many of ACWA’s and CWF’s recommendations
into the SGMA.30 These recommendations included defining the relationship
between groundwater and surface water, improving local agencies’ regulatory
tools, articulating sustainability standards, and providing a state “backstop”
authority when local agency action fails.31 The SGMA also provides local
agencies with the tools and incentives needed to protect groundwater basins and
32
users’ rights. Subsection one explains the prioritization of basins and how
23. See 2014 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 346 (enacting CAL. WATER CODE § 113) (emphasizing local control);
see also Williams, supra note 21; ASS’N OF CAL. WATER AGENCIES, SUSTAINABILITY FROM THE GROUND UP:
GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENT IN CALIFORNIA—A FRAMEWORK (2011) (providing a framework for
sustainable ground water management in California).
24. RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 14.
25. Id. at 9.
26. Hearing Agenda, Joint Informational Hearing on Management of California’s Groundwater
Resources Before the Assemb. Water, Parks & Wildlife Comm. and the Assemb. Budget Subcomm. No. 3, 2014
Leg., 2013–2014 Sess. (Cal. 2014) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); Hearing Agenda,
Oversight Hearing on Managing California’s Groundwater: Issues and Challenge Before the S. Natural Res. &
Water Comm., 2014 Leg., 2013–2014 Sess. (Cal. 2014) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
27. RICHARD M. FRANK, CALIFORNIA GROUNDWATER LAW: AN OVERVIEW (2014).
28. See 2014 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 348 (giving the State Water Resources Control Board power to place a
basin on probationary status if certain deadlines were not met).
29. Signing Press Release, supra note 17.
30. See AB 1168, 2014 Leg., 2013–2014 Sess. (Cal. 2014) (enacted by Chapter 346); AB 1739, 2014
Leg., 2013–2014 Sess. (Cal. 2014) (enacted by Chapter 347); AB 1319, 2014 Leg., 2013–2014 Sess. (Cal.
2014) (enacted by Chapter 347) (including measurable milestones every few years, giving the State Water
Board and Department of Water Resources (DWR) “backstop” authority, and allowing local agencies to charge
fees to enforce their GSPs are some such recommendations).
31. RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 14, at 5–7, 9–10, 12; CAL. WATER FOUND., RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR SUSTAINABLE GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENT: DEVELOPED THROUGH A STAKEHOLDER DIALOGUE 22–24,
27–30 (2014).
32. See CALIFORNIA WATER ACTION PLAN, supra note 16 (including basin priorities, formation of GSAs,
and the implementation of GSPs).
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SGMA’s deadlines affect appropriative rights. Subsection two discusses how
private companies can join a Groundwater Sustainability Agency (GSA), and
subsection three discusses SGMA’s requirements for implementing a
Groundwater Sustainability Plan (GSP) and what happens when a GSA fails to
adopt one.34
1. Basin Priority and Appropriative Rights
The Department of Water Resources (DWR) must evaluate and designate
35
groundwater basins as very low, low, medium, and high-priority. Basins
designated as high- or medium-priority must adopt a GSP by January 31, 2020.36
During GSP development, SGMA prohibits groundwater users from increasing
their water usage to expand appropriative rights.37
2. Formation of a GSA
Initiation of GSA formation may include both local agencies and private
38
mutual water companies through a Joint Powers Agreement (JPA). The powers
given to a private mutual water company are the same as the rest of the parties so
the JPA does not alter the authority of the GSA.39 Once formed, the GSA must
40
inform DWR of its creation and submit its area of control for evaluation. A
single GSA need not cover the entire basin; however, all individual GSAs must
coordinate their GSPs to reach one sustainability goal.41
3. Implementation of a GSP and the Consequences of Failure
GSAs wield authority ranging from collecting fees to conducting
investigations in order to best implement a GSP.42 In order to ensure progress
towards sustainability, a GSP must use a fifty-year “planning and implementation
horizon” with measurable objectives and milestones every five years.43 If a GSA
fails to meet SGMA’s requirements, the State Water Board may place all or part
33. See infra Part II.B.1 (describing that basins are prioritized by their status of priority).
34. See infra Part II.B.2–3 (showing that private companies can join a GSA through JPAs and
demonstrating what happens when a GSA fails to adopt a GSP).
35. See CAL. WATER CODE §§ 10720.5–10735.2 (West 2015) (existing law regarding priority under
Sustainable Groundwater Management Act).
36. Id. § 10735.2(a)(5)(A).
37. Id. § 10720.5(a).
38. Id. § 10723.6(a).
39. Id.
40. Id. § 10723.8(a).
41. Id. § 10727.6.
42. Id. §§ 10725(a), 10726.8(a).
43. Id. §§ 10721(q), 10727.2(b)(1).
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of a basin on probationary status and develop an interim plan of its own.
However, the State Water Board may exempt “good actors” who attempt to meet
SGMA’s requirements, but fail because of an uncooperative party.45
III. CHAPTER 255

Chapter 255 makes some changes to the Sustainable Groundwater
Management Act.46 The original SGMA left several fundamental questions
unanswered, thereby preventing effective implementation of GSPs.47 Chapter 255
attempts to remedy some of these issues by granting extensions to SGMA
deadlines when litigation delays implementation of a GSP and by making a slight
change to how private mutual water companies can join GSAs.48
Chapter 255 reflects the possibility that litigation may prevent interested
49
parties from meeting SGMA’s deadlines. For example, GSAs must establish
basin boundaries within five years after a basin is reprioritized as medium- or
high-priority.50 The State Water Board has discretion to extend that deadline for
a period equal to the length of the litigation, if the GSA can show that litigation
prevented implementation of a GSP that was likely to reach the GSA’s
51
sustainability goal. Therefore, Chapter 255 allows the State Water Board to treat
litigation delay as a factor when making a probationary status designation.52
Chapter 255 limits private mutual water companies’ ability to join GSAs to
53
either a memorandum of agreement or other limited legal agreement. Chapter
255 removes JPAs as a possible method of forming GSAs with private mutual
54
water companies. Chapter 255 also ensures that private mutual water companies
55
do not gain any special or additional powers through such an agreement.

44. Id. § 10735.4(c).
45. Id. § 10735.2(e).
46. See CAL. WATER CODE §§ 5202, 10720.5, 10720.7, 10722.2, 10722.4, 10723, 10723.6, 10723.8,
10724, 10726.8, 10730.2, 10733.2, 10733.3, 10735.2, 10735.4, 10735.6, and 10933 (amended by Chapter 255)
(amending sections of the California Water Code originally enacted by SGMA).
47. See WATER §§ 10727.2, 10728.6 (failing to address what happens when litigation impedes
implementation of a GSP, how a GSA can encourage the cooperation of state entities, the availability of private
funding, and how CEQA applies to the formation of GSAs).
48. See infra Part III (explaining the changes made by Chapter 255).
49. See CAL. WATER CODE § 10735.2(d) (enacted by Chapter 255) (providing extensions if litigation does
prevent meeting deadlines).
50. Id. § 10722.4(d) (enacted by Chapter 255).
51. Id. § 10735.2(d) (enacted by Chapter 255).
52. Id.
53. Id. § 10723.6(b) (enacted by Chapter 255).
54. See id. 10723.6(b) (enacted by Chapter 255) (specifying that private mutual water companies and
Public Utilities Companies do not have access to JPAs as a means of joining GSAs).
55. See id. (subjecting private companies to local control).
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IV. ANALYSIS
The goal of Chapter 255 is to implement the Sustainable Groundwater
Management Act efficiently and effectively.56 There were too many uncertainties
57
to effectively adopt GSPs under SGMA. While Chapter 255 effects a few small
changes, it is not nearly as aggressive as it could be.58 Allowing the State Water
Board to stay a probationary status designation may seem like a drastic change
from existing law, but staying the designation for a period equal in length to
delaying litigation is not as helpful as previously proposed legislation.59 The two
five-year extensions proposed in AB 617—before the Senate Committee on
Natural Resources and Water amended it—would have provided GSAs with
more leeway to meet deadlines in the event of litigation delays.60 Additionally,
allowing private mutual water companies to join GSAs is helpful to dwindling
GSA membership; however, preventing private mutual water companies from
exercising JPAs limits versatility.61 Section A compares the deadline extensions
62
in Chapter 255 and those in AB 617. Section B explores the ability for private
63
mutual water companies to join GSAs. Section C discusses the changes that
Chapter 255 did not incorporate and the possible ramifications this could have on
64
SGMA. Finally, Section D examines Chapter 255 as a piece of consensus
65
legislation.

56. See id. §§ 5202, 10720.5, 10720.7, 10722.2, 10722.4, 10723, 10723.6, 10723.8, 10724, 10726.8,
10730.2, 10733.2, 10733.3, 10735.2, 10735.4, 10735.6, and 10933 (amended by Chapter 255) (making changes
to SGMA that clear up questions and inefficiencies).
57. Compare CAL. WATER CODE §§ 10720.5–10735.4 (West 2015) (showing SGMA as enacted in 2014),
with SB 13, 2014 Leg., 2013–2014 Sess. (Cal. 2014) (enacted by Chapter 255) (amending and adding sections
to SGMA that clarify ambiguities).
58. Compare CAL. WATER CODE §§ 5202, 10720.5, 10720.7, 10722.2, 10722.4, 10723, 10723.6,
10723.8, 10724, 10726.8, 10730.2, 10733.2, 10733.3, 10735.2, 10735.4, 10735.6, and 10933 (amended by
Chapter 255) (detailing SGMA’s deadlines and procedures), with AB 617, 2015 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal.
2015) (as amended on June 29, 2015, but not enacted) (proposing changes to SGMA’s deadlines and
procedures).
59. Compare CAL. WATER CODE § 10735.2(d) (enacted by Chapter 255) (SGMA’s litigation procedures
regarding probationary basins), with AB 617 2015 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2015) (as amended on June 29,
2015, but not enacted) (proposing changes in classification of probationary basins due to delay caused by
litigation).
60. See AB 617, 2015 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2015) (as amended on June 29, 2015, but not enacted)
(providing a possible extension totaling ten years—a period likely to outlast most litigation).
61. See CAL. WATER CODE § 10735.2(b) (enacted by Chapter 255) (excluding joint powers agreements as
a means for private mutual water companies from joining GSAs).
62. See infra Part IV.A (comparing the deadline extensions given by AB 617 and Chapter 255).
63. See infra Part IV.B (describing private mutual water companies and GSAs).
64. See infra Part IV.C (demonstrating the negative implications arising from Chapter 255 not including
some of AB 617’s proposals).
65. See infra Part IV.D (explaining that Chapter 255 is a consolidated bill).
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A. Defining Litigation as “Good Cause:” Chapter 255 vs. AB 617 Before
Consolidation
GSAs face three main types of litigation: (1) litigation challenging the GSA’s
authority; (2) CEQA litigation for projects that have a severe impact on the
environment; and (3) adjudications.66 Adjudications will likely create uncertainty
when implementing GSPs.67 Also, certain adjudications must be determined
before implementing a GSP because questions, such as the validity of pumping
restrictions, create far-reaching consequences for everyone, from corporations to
farmers.68 Both Chapter 255 and AB 617 include litigation in the definition of
69
“good cause” for deadline extensions. By doing so, they clarify the vehicle by
which the State Water Board can institute or delay state backstop procedures.70
Chapter 255 allows—and AB 617 would have allowed—a GSA to have
advanced knowledge of changed deadlines when implementing a GSP, because it
gives DWR the ability to stay the State Water Board’s intervention.71
Opponents of AB 617 probably feared that GSAs would use unrelated
72
litigation to delay implementing parts of a GSP. Therefore, Chapter 255’s
limitations on the length of extensions may relieve this concern.73 While
opponents had a right to be concerned, AB 617 provided useful clarity for when
74
the State Water Board could stay an intervention. With AB 617’s language,
GSAs would have more concretely understood the length of their extensions.75
DWR’s reevaluation of the extension after the first five years would almost
76
certainly help mitigate any fear of unneeded delays. Chapter 255 moves in the
right direction; however, having a definite end to deadline extensions would be
77
more beneficial for GSP implementation.

66. Interview with Jennifer Harder, Professor, McGeorge School of Law (July 2, 2015) (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. CAL. WATER CODE § 10735.2(d); AB 617, 2015 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2015) (as amended on
June 29, 2015, but not enacted).
70. See AB 617, 2015 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2015) (as amended on June 29, 2015, but not enacted)
(giving the State Water Board definitive directions to adhere to DWR’s granting of five-year extensions).
71. See CAL. WATER CODE § 10735.2(d) (enacted by Chapter 255) (giving GSAs a deadline extension
equal to the length of the litigation); see also AB 617, 2015 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2015) (as amended on
June 29, 2015, but not enacted) (giving a GSA up to two five-year extensions to resolve any litigation and
properly move forward with implementing a GSP in the most informed way possible).
72. Interview with Jennifer Harder, supra note 66.
73. See CAL. WATER CODE § 10735.2(d) (enacted by Chapter 255) (changing the AB 617 language to
offer a less definite period of deadline extensions).
74. See supra Part IV.A (defining AB 617’s “good cause” for allowing a stay of intervention).
75. AB 617, 2015 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2015) (as amended on June 29, 2015, but not enacted).
76. Id. (requiring DWR to reevaluate the extension after five years rather than just giving a ten-year
extension initially).
77. See supra Part IV.A (comparing the benefits of deadline extensions in AB 617 with Chapter 255).
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B. Including Private Mutual Water Companies in GSAs: Chapter 255 vs. AB
617 Before Consolidation
Chapter 255 allows GSAs to include private mutual water companies through
78
a memorandum of understanding or some other legal agreement. In contrast,
AB 617 granted private mutual water companies all powers in common between
members of a GSA through a JPA.79 One pitfall of AB 617 was that it did not
80
define the transparency requirements of JPAs. This is significant because
existing law requires different levels of public access to local public agency
meetings and private water company meetings.81 To determine the benefits of AB
617’s method, it is necessary to examine the transparency requirements for local
public agencies, the transparency requirements of private mutual water
companies, including pending legislation, and finally, the ambiguities between
AB 617 and the laws governing JPAs.82
1. Local Public Agency Transparency
Local public agencies are subject to the Ralph M. Brown Act (Brown Act).83
The Brown Act prohibits private discussion or deliberation of a quorum of public
agency board members from discussing issues within their subject matter
jurisdiction to ensure that there is transparency in their decisions.84 It also
85
requires the public agency to publish notice of regular and advisory meetings.
The Brown Act also limits the location of these meetings to the boundary of the
territory in which the agency exercises jurisdiction.86 The legislature added these
transparency restrictions because it believed that public agencies exist for the
people and that they should operate openly.87
2. Private Mutual Water Company Transparency and Recent Legislation
The Brown Act does not regulate private mutual water companies; however,
Chapter 633 of the Statutes of 2013 added sections 14305–14307 to the
Corporations Code, requiring most mutual water companies to use more
78. CAL. WATER CODE § 10723.6(b) (enacted by Chapter 255).
79. AB 617, 2015 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2015) (as amended on June 29, 2015, but not enacted).
80. Id.
81. Compare CAL. GOV’T CODE § 54950 (West 2015) (imposing open meeting requirements on local
public agencies), with CAL. CORP. CODE § 14305 (West 2015) (requiring admittance of eligible parties to
regular meetings, but not to meetings called as “executive sessions”).
82. See infra Part IV.B.3 (discussing transparency requirements and ambiguities in the current law).
83. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 54950 et seq. (West 2015).
84. Id. § 54952.2(b)(1).
85. Id. § 54954(a).
86. Id. § 54954(b).
87. Id. § 54950.
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transparent practices. Dubbed the “Mutual Water Company Open Meeting Act,”
section 14305 allows eligible parties access to board of directors’ meetings.89 But,
this access ends when the board of directors meets in an “executive session.”90
Currently, a board of directors can call a private, executive session for a variety
of reasons and only record the session in the next regular meeting’s minutes.91
Some do not find this method of open meetings to be effective.92
Assembly Member Chris Holden introduced Chapter 669 to amend section
14305 in 2015.93 Chapter 669 prohibits private mutual water company board
members from calling executive sessions outside of a regular meeting.94 This
change ensures that interested parties have access to the regular meeting even if
they cannot listen in on the executive session.95 While private mutual water
companies are not subject to the same requirements as public agencies, and while
Chapter 669 provides more transparency, the Corporations Code imposes
96
additional open meeting requirements.
3. AB 617 and Joint Powers Agreements
As discussed above, the Brown Act does not regulate private mutual water
97
companies. However, it does require JPA meetings to occur within limited
98
areas. Critics of AB 617 were uncertain whether the Brown Act or California
Corporations Code would apply to control private mutual water company
99
operations. Although AB 617 no longer addresses transparency, if private
companies were allowed to join GSAs through a JPA, it would undoubtedly
100
provide more versatility to GSA formation. Thus, Chapter 255’s rejection of
JPAs as an option to include private mutual water companies in GSAs
101
significantly limits versatility.
88. See CAL. CORP. CODE. § 14305(b) (West 2015).
89. Id. § 14305(b).
90. Id.
91. Id. § 14305(b)–(c).
92. See AB 1077, 2015 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2015) (enacted by Chapter 669) (attempting to
amend section 14305 of the California Corporations Code to restrict the occasions of executive sessions and the
delay in recording one’s occurrence).
93. Id.
94. Id. § 14305(b)(2).
95. Id.
96. Compare CAL. GOV’T CODE § 54950 (West 2015) (imposing open meeting requirements on local
public agencies), and AB 1077, 2015 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2015) (enacted by Chapter 669) (preventing
board members from calling executive sessions outside of a general meeting), with CORP. CODE § 14305
(providing a variety of requirements for open meetings).
97. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
98. GOV’T CODE § 54954(d).
99. Interview with Jennifer Harder, supra note 66.
100. See supra Part IV.A.1–2 (discussing JPAs in relation to private mutual water companies).
101. See supra Part IV.B (discussing the versatility of JPAs in GSA formation).
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C. The Legal Ramifications of Not Including All of AB 617’s Proposed Changes
AB 617 introduced several changes to SGMA that Chapter 255 excluded
when consolidating groundwater legislation.102 The first change exempts forming
103
104
GSAs from CEQA. The second creates default GSAs. The third consolidates
the definitions of “in lieu use” and “groundwater recharge.”105 The final change
AB 617 made was to the tolling provisions that prevented over allocation of
106
prescriptive rights.
1. Why Have Chapter 255 Exempt GSA Formation from CEQA?
“CEQA is a focal point of litigation against public agencies.”107 The
legislature enacted CEQA to mitigate significant environmental impacts.108 Since
CEQA’s enactment, the legislature has enacted more than 120 additional
environmental laws.109 Unfortunately, when an agency satisfies these other
110
environmental laws, it frequently expects a CEQA lawsuit. These lawsuits
delay or entirely prevent projects with any environmental impact and often serve
as a deterrent for even environmentally desirable projects.111 The fear of an
abusive CEQA lawsuit often inhibits CEQA’s ability to protect the
112
environment.
When the legislature enacted SGMA, it recognized that CEQA could
113
114
potentially harm a GSA. SGMA exempted GSPs from CEQA. While Chapter
255 did not remove the GSP exception to CEQA, its author did not share the
opinion that an exception for GSA formation logically flowed backwards in the
115
SGMA process. There can always be litigation about the formation of GSAs for
102. See supra Part IV.A–B (comparing the provisions of AB 617 that were removed when Ab 617 was
consolidated into Chapter 255).
103. See infra Part IV.C.1 (discussing why exempting GSA from CEQA is beneficial).
104. See infra Part IV.C.2 (explaining default GSAs).
105. See infra Part IV.C.3 (discussing in lieu use of groundwater recharge).
106. See infra Part IV.C.4 (analyzing over allocation of prescriptive rights).
107. Interview with Jennifer Harder, supra note 66.
108. Cal. Natural Res. Agency, Frequently Asked Questions about CEQA, http://resources.ca.gov/ceqa/
more/faq.html (last visited July 6, 2015) [hereinafter FAQs] (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review).
109. POLICY PRINCIPLES FOR CEQA MODERNIZATION, CEQA WORKING GROUP (2015), available at
http://rctc.org/uploads/media_items/ceqa-working-group-policy-principles-fact-sheet.original.pdf (on file with
The University of the Pacific Law Review).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See id. (stressing that thoughtful modernization of CEQA can both prevent its abuse and preserve its
intent of protecting the environment).
113. See CAL. WATER CODE § 10728.6 (exempting GSPs from CEQA’s requirements).
114. Id.
115. AB 617, 2015 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2015) (as amended on June 29, 2015, but not enacted);
Interview with Jennifer Harder, supra note 66.
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other reasons, but the high likelihood of a CEQA lawsuit necessitated AB 617 to
exempt forming GSAs from CEQA.116 Otherwise, the GSA may not have formed
by SGMA’s June 30, 2017 deadline and would have required DWR to grant
117
extensions, ultimately delaying a basin from reaching its sustainability goal.
This effect may be undesirable, and therefore, Chapter 255 may have benefited
from exempting GSA formation from CEQA.118
2. Default GSAs
The inability to saturate a basin with GSAs poses a common problem for
SGMA.119 While relying on local control allows for tailored sustainability
policies, local agencies might not participate.120 AB 617 attempted to create
fallback agencies for when GSAs did not fully cover a basin.121 This type of
situation required a delicate touch because maintaining local control was a
122
cornerstone of SGMA. If the situation did arise, AB 617 would have designated
123
the county in which the basin lies as the default GSA. However, the county
124
could have refused to be the GSA. If the county did refuse, individual water
125
users would have been required to report groundwater extractions. While this
reporting method helps prevent unnecessary or non-beneficial pumping, a
cooperative plan cannot exist under such reporting standards.126
Without a designated GSA, the State Water Board may place part of a basin
127
on probationary status and institute an interim plan. Unfortunately, this would
defeat the purpose of utilizing local agencies to create sustainability.128 Without
further refinement, AB 617 failed to determine who would be next in line as a

116. See infra text accompanying notes 141–42.
117. See generally AB 617, 2015 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2015) (as amended on June 29, 2015, but
not enacted).
118. See supra Part IV.C.1 (detailing the benefits of exempting GSA formation rom CEQA).
119. Interview with Jennifer Harder, supra note 66.
120. See AB 617, 2015 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2015) (as amended on June 29, 2015, but not
enacted) (anticipating that local agencies may not elect to for GSAs).
121. See id. (designating the county in which the basin lies as the fallback GSA).
122. See e.g., AB 1168, 2014 Leg., 2013–2014 Sess. (Cal. 2014) (enacted by Chapter 346); AB 1739,
2014 Leg., 2013–2014 Sess. (Cal. 2014) (enacted by Chapter 347).
123. AB 617, 2015 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2015) (as amended on June 29, 2015, but not enacted).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See CAL. WATER CODE § 5203 (West 2015) (requiring detailed reports by individual groundwater
extractors but offering no overall protection of the groundwater basin).
127. AB 617, 2015 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2015) (as amended on June 29, 2015, but not enacted)
128. Compare id. (resulting in sustainability plan by the State Water Board—a state entity), with SGMA
BROCHURE, supra note 13 (stating that the goal of SGMA is to provide local agencies with control over
groundwater basins).
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default GSA. When Chapter 255 consolidated AB 617, it did not clarify this
question.130 Of course, an interim plan creates more sustainability than no plan,
but the goal of the SGMA required full participation by local agencies.131 AB 617
moved toward the goal of sustainability, but Chapter 255 did not build upon that
progress.132
3. In Lieu Use as Groundwater Recharge
The concept of “in lieu use” refers to using surface water in place of
133
groundwater systems to recharge over-drafted groundwater basins. Section
1200 of the California Water Code, which gives the State Water Board
jurisdiction over surface water and subterranean streams, has necessitated in lieu
use.134 This necessity arose because Courts have upheld Section 1200 as
excluding percolating groundwater, limiting the State Water Board’s ability to
135
utilize those particular subterranean systems. This limitation is significant
because the use of percolating groundwater would drastically increase
California’s ability to recharge over-drafted basins.136 Recently, a concept called
137
“interconnected systems” has affected in lieu use. Interconnected systems are a
combination of surface water and groundwater systems that become
interconnected when percolating groundwater is pumped in amounts that begin to
138
affect surface water levels. These interconnected systems may give the State

129. See AB 617, 2015 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2015) (as amended on June 29, 2015, but not
enacted) (failing to designate another GSA should a county refuse to be the default).
130. See 2015 Cal. STAT. ch. 255 (failing to designate another GSA should a county reguse to be the
default as well).
131. See SGMA BROCHURE, supra note 13 (stating that the intent of SGMA is to provide a framework for
local agencies to sustainably manage groundwater basins).
132. See supra Part IV.C.2 (discussing the progress AB 617 made toward sustainability).
133. See Interview with Jennifer Harder, supra note 66 (referring to “in liue use” as using surface water to
recharge groundwater basins).
134. CAL. WATER CODE §1200 (West 2015); Interview with Jennifer Harder, supra note 66.
135. See N. Gualala Water Co. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 139 Cal. App. 4th 1577, 1606 (2006)
(upholding the State Water Board’s four-part test to differentiate subterranean streams from percolating
groundwater and thus granting the State Water Board jurisdiction because the groundwater in question was
determined to be a subterranean stream); see also Interview with Jennifer Harder, supra note 66 (discussing
subterranean streams and how they are different from percolating groundwater).
136. See AB 617, 2015 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2015) (as amended on June 29, 2015, but not
enacted) (including surface water in lieu of groundwater as a method to replenish depleted groundwater basins).
137. See AB 617, 2015 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2015) (as amended on June 29, 2015, but not
enacted) (defining “significant depletions of interconnected surface waters” as having to do with a reduction in
surface water flows that are connected to groundwater basins); see also Interview with Harder, supra note 66
(discussing the reduction in surface water flows that are connected to groundwater).
138. See supra note 137 (defining “interconnected systems”).
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Water Board a method to obtain jurisdiction over percolating groundwater using
the Public Trust Doctrine and are the subject of ELF v. The State Water Board.139
The State Water Board has jurisdiction over all publicly used waterways
140
through the Public Trust Doctrine. When pumping percolating groundwater
affects surface water and harms the public uses covered under the Public Trust
Doctrine, it is uncertain whether the State Water Board then has jurisdiction over
141
the percolating groundwater. The outcome of ELF v. The State Water Board
could define whether groundwater recharge can include “in lieu” use in its
definition, but by not resolving the issue statutorily, Chapter 255 leaves the issue
142
to the uncertainties of litigation. While groundwater recharge remains essential
to over-drafted groundwater basins, the ambiguity of what counts as groundwater
recharge will inhibit enough recharge from happening until it is resolved.143
Opponents of AB 617 feared that including in lieu use as groundwater
recharge would allow users to abuse the system through false claims of
144
groundwater recharge. While this fear was legitimate, AB 617 provided a
145
means to increase sorely needed groundwater recharge. Therefore, Chapter 255
should have considered merging the definition of “in lieu use” with that of
146
“groundwater recharge.”
4. Over-Allocation of Prescriptive Rights
The State Water Board bases prescriptive groundwater rights on how much
water a rights-holder actually uses.147 The opposition feared a “rush to the pump
house” where water users attempt to increase their appropriation rights by
148
increasing their usage amount during the evaluation period. Opponents
139. See Second Amended Petition for Writ of Mandamus and Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive
Relief, Envtl. Law Found. Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’n v. State Water Res. Control Bd., Case No.
34-2010-80000583 (Oct. 4, 2013) (requesting that the Court require the State Water Board use the Public Trust
Doctrine to prevent Siskiyou County from issuing well-drilling permits); see also Interview with Harder, supra
note 66 (discussing the State Water Board use of the Public Trust Doctrine).
140. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 444 (1983); Interview with Harder, supra
note 66.
141. Compare Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 33 Cal. 3d. at 436 (holding that the Public Trust Doctrine should
apply to the “extraction of water that destroys navigation and other public interests” [emphasis omitted]), and
Interview with Harder, supra note 66, with Second Amended Petition, supra note 139 (continuing litigation
regarding the Public Trust Doctrine).
142. See Second Amended Petition, supra note 139 (continuing litigation that may give the State Water
Board the ability to regulate percolating groundwater extraction if the Public Trust Doctrine applies).
143. AB 647 FACT SHEET, supra note 5, at 2.
144. Interview with Jennifer Harder, supra note 66.
145. See AB 647 FACT SHEET, supra note 5, at 2 (explaining the dire importance of groundwater recharge
in California).
146. See supra Part IV.C.3 (showing the benefits of including “in lieu use” in the definition of
groundwater recharge).
147. FAQs, supra note 108
148. Interview with Harder, supra note 66.
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believed that changing the language of the tolling requirements would cause
water users to “rush to the pump house” before the actual adoption of the GSP.149
Once GSP implementation occurred, GSAs could begin regulating percolating
150
groundwater rights for the first time. AB 617 could have approached the
prescriptive right allocation issue more carefully, and, for this reason, Chapter
255’s failure to change the prescriptive right tolling provisions may not have
151
been in error.
D. Chapter 255 as Consensus Legislation
Legislators put forth several groundwater bills during the 2015 session,
including Chapter 255, AB 453, AB 939, AB 1242, and AB 617.152 When these
bills reached the Senate Committee on Natural Resources and Water—chaired by
153
Senator Pavley—the Committee consolidated each bill into Chapter 255.

Streamlining these bills into one piece of legislation would have been
effective, if that single streamlined bill had incorporated language that
would have better implemented SGMA’s objectives.154 Chapter 255 is a less
effective piece of consensus legislation because it does not include the aggressive
changes AB 617 contained, which would have provided more opportunities to
achieve the goal of groundwater sustainability.155 Senator Pavley’s strong and
focused leadership over groundwater legislation this session has left SGMA in
156
nearly the same state as when enacted.
There is a clear difference between Chapter 255 and AB 617 in the number
of changes each made and the aggressiveness of those changes: Chapter 255 only
makes two substantive changes, neither of which are as aggressive as AB 617’s
157
suggested changes. Furthermore, three of the four changes Chapter 255
excluded had promising possibilities for bettering SGMA and achieving

149. Id. (discussing the tolling requirements change of restricting pumping between January 1, 2015 and
when a GSP is adopted to between January 1, 2015 and when an “action to regulate groundwater extractions”
occurs)
150. Id.
151. See supra Part IV.C.4 (discussing the merits of not accepting AB 617’s changes to the tolling
provisions).
152. AB 453, 2015 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2015) (as amended on July 6, 2015, but not enacted); AB
939, 2015 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2015) (as introduced on February 26, 2015, but not enacted); AB 1242,
2015 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2015) (as amended on May 5, 2015, but not enacted); AB 617, 2015 Leg.,
2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2015) (as amended on June 29, 2015, but not enacted).
153. See 2015 Cal. STAT. ch. 255 (as amended May 21, 2015, but not enacted) (consolidating AB 453,
AB 939, AB 1242, and AB 617 into Chapter 255).
154. See supra text accompanying note 49.
155. AB 617, 2015 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2015) (as amended on June 29, 2015, but not enacted).
156. See supra Part IV.C (discussing the possible changes to SGMA that Chapter 255 could have made).
157. See supra notes 115, 129, 145 and accompanying text.
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groundwater sustainability. But, as Governor Brown has made clear, now is not
the time to make small adjustments to groundwater sustainability.159 If the State
cannot recharge its groundwater aquifers and create sustainable groundwater
plans, then irreversible consequences, such as land subsidence, will continue to
plague California’s groundwater basins.160 Perhaps SGMA and Chapter 255 will
be enough for California’s groundwater basins to avoid the permanent and
irreversible damage that is already beginning to take place and that more drastic
legislation is not necessary.161
V. CONCLUSION
California relies heavily on its water supply to provide drinking water,
promote agriculture, and prevent fires.162 Groundwater is an essential part of that
163
supply. Ensuring that California uses its groundwater basins in a sustainable
manner is essential to navigating the current drought and protect against future
164
droughts. While imperfect, SGMA is a step toward obtaining statewide
groundwater sustainability.165 Chapter 255 fleshes out SGMA, but SGMA may
require more aggressive changes to ensure a steady stream of sustainable
166
groundwater in California.

158. See supra Part IV.C (discussing how exempting GSA formation from CEQA, identifying default
GSAs, and including in lieu use in the definition of groundwater recharge would benefit SGMA).
159. See AB 647 FACT SHEET, supra note 5 (detailing the dire situations of over-drafted groundwater
aquifers).
160. Id.
161. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
162. See Emergency Press Release, supra note 1 (asking Californians to conserve water to protect
agriculture, prevent fires, and prevent a shortage in drinking water).
163. AB 647 FACT SHEET, supra note 5.
164. See id. (explaining the importance of groundwater recharge—a part of sustainable basin operation—
to prevent permanent damage).
165. Press Release, CA Water Found., supra note 7, at 1. (quoting Lester Snow, executive director of the
California Water Foundation, that SGMA was “a long overdue system for managing groundwater resources”).
166. See supra Part IV.A–B (discussing changes to SGMA that could help reach permanent groundwater
sustainability).
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